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Rome and its Frontier in the North:
The Role of the Periphery
by WILLEM J.H. WILLEMS
When Caius lulius Caesar started the conquest of
Gaul, a chain of events was started which fun-
damentally altered the structure of the Roman
state and of Roman society. The change was, of
course, even more drastic for Rome's northern
neighbours. But it is equally obvious that develop-
ments, and their outcome, were not the same for
each of those nieghbours. In recent literature on
the subject, ' it is increasingly acknowledged that
the structure of native societies was a crucial fac-
tor in the process of their integration in the Ro-
man empire, but also at an earlier stage. It in-
fluenced the process of expansion of the empire,
and it was a major underlying determinant for the
termination of that process, in other words: for the
origin and location of frontiers.
The concepts of frontier and of frontier society
are difficult ones, to which entire conferences have
been devoted.2 It is not the purpose of this paper
to examine all relevant aspects, but to explore
some of the differences that existed not between
the areas within and beyond the frontier, but be-
tween the frontier area itself and its hinterland as
well as the regions in front of it. In accordance with
the themes of the conference, this will be done from
two points of view: the different integration into
the Roman empire of native societies in areas
which became part of the frontier zone, and the
specific role of this periphery in the emergence of
new states in the Early-Middle Ages.
This means that, from a chronogical point of
view, the earliest and the latest phases of Roman
rule in the north, the 1st and 4th-5th centuries,
will receive special attention. In spatial terms, dis-
cussion will largely be limited to one sector of the
northern frontier, namely, that of the German
provinces in present-day Germany and the Nether-
lands.
It is not possible, in the present context, to dis-
cuss at length the complicated and often conflict-
ing theories on the growth of empires in general
or of the Imperium Romanum in particular. But
it is useful to examine some concepts which give
insight into the process of expansion and thus im-
plicitly into the factors which terminate that
process. When we understand why a frontier is
reached or established, that also provides a clue to
its nature.
Imperialism and Colonialism
The expansion of states, as a process, is generally
referred to as imperialism or colonialism, and they
are the result of dominance/dependency relations
between one society and another.3 The concepts
are sometimes used interchangeably, which to
some degree they are, but imperialism is normal-
ly considered the more general term for the situa-
tion in which one society or state controls another
and in fact the cause of colonialism, although they
are, at the same time, different forms of domina-
tion which may coexist.4 The difference lies
mainly in the degree or rather character of this
control which, in the case of colonialism, is inevita-
bly direct and involves the movement of people.5
In both cases, the prerequisite for domination
is an inequality in the resources of the social sys-
tems involved, including their own internal struc-
ture. This difference may be expressed in forms
of coercion. It is perhaps useful to look for gener-
al laws in domination processes, but it is more like-
ly that the specific historical context and the soci-
eties — or even certain individuals — involved will
have determined the precise causes in each case.
All do, however, have at least one other common
denominator in addition to coercion, and that is
that at least at the point where imperialism turns
into colonialism, there must be an interest at stake.
The nature of this interest, and whether it simply
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Fig. 1. A model of frontier dynamics, illustrating the role of
environmental and group conflict as a stimulus to frontier in-
novation. After Willeras 1984, Hg. 124.
arose or was deliberately pursued, is more or less
irrelevant: it may be economical, political, ideo-
logical, all such motives together, or something
else. From an analytical point of view it may even
be completely unintelligible, it just has to be im-
portant enough. It is easy to see why this should
be so, for colonising has its price: it means the ex-
penditure of energy.
This becomes especially clear when we look at
the relation between imperialism and colonialism.
Imperialism, when not defined as an umbrella con-
cept but the antecedent stage of, or the alterna-
tive for, colonialism, also implies coercion. But it
is a form of domination which consumes much
smaller amounts of energy. It does not involve
moving significant numbers of people but it is
primarily based on the transfer of information.
The distinction between "power" and "force"
made by Luttwak (1976, 195-200) will serve to
clarify this point.
In his analysis, force is essentially a physical
phenomenon which is consumed in application
and wanes over distance: "... military force is in-
deed governed by constraints on accumulation,
use, transmission, and dispersion akin to the phys-
ical laws that condition mechanical force" (op. cit.,
196-7). Power, on the other hand, works very
differently: "It works not by causing effects direct-
ly, but by eliciting responses — if all goes well,
the desired responses". When you use force to ob-
tain obedience, you use energy, but when you are
obeyed because of your power, it is the object of
your power who is the actor and therefore the one
who uses energy. The power itself is not a physi-
cal phenomenon, so it is not consumed by this ac-
tion. It remains the same, just as — in principle
— it does not diminish over distance. But power
does not exist unless it is perceived: it is not
something at the level of matter or energy, but on
that of information. Of course there is a relation
between the two, in that ultimately power is based
on force and on its perception and "correct"
evaluation, which is obedience. Power does not
work when the means of perception are lacking or
when the evaluation is "wrong" or, in other
words, when prior information about force has
been unintelligible or insufficient. Unless, of
course, an error was made or a risk taken. In all
these cases force has to be used directly, but it is
evident that a careful power-policy requires much
less input of energy than the use of force, where
the output is proportional to the input.
Luttwak's direction between power and force is
also applicable in a distinction between imperial-
ism and colonialism. Imperialism is a patron-client
relationship, based on a flow of information which
allows a low-cost domination because of the client's
perception of the patron's power. Colonialism, on
the other hand, is characterized by the use of direct
force. It is not just a flow of information but a flow
of matter and energy which is decisive in this case.
This makes colonialism a relatively expensive en-
terprise and that is why there has to be some sort
of necessity or interest at stake for the colonizer.
Another consequence of the use of energy is that,
in contrast to information, it is finite. Depending
on the capacity of the system and the general con-
ditions under which the process takes place, some-
where a limit is reached, which brings us to the
concept of the frontier.
It is not helpful to discuss this in a very general
way, because there are evidently some major
differences between imperialism and colonialism
before and after the 15th century when they be-
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came intercontinental in scope. When thus limit-
ed to ancient empires, or archaic civilizations in
the sense as described by Service,6 it is possible
to apply the ideas concerning the structure of front-
iers developed by Lattimore.7 In an expading
empire, the frontier is dynamic: in Roman terms,
this is Vergil's (Aen. I, 280) impenum sine fine. There
is sufficient energy left to control or incorporate
new units. In Lattimore's terminology, this would
be a "frontier of inclusion". In the colonial situa-
tion, if a point is reached where an energy-surplus
is no longer available, a static frontier develops,
the "frontier of exclusion".
The reasons for a frontier to become fixed are,
of course, more complicated than this and may be
found in the natural as much as in the social en-
vironment, but in the end energy is the main fac-
tor. Even the very important role of innovation
is, in principle, only of temporary importance as
is shown by fig. 1.
When we look at the areas constituting an em-
pire instead of at these general processes, it is clear
that the same energy argument causes differences
from the core region to the periphery. For the em-
pire as whole, several zones can be distinguished
as proposed by Lattimore (1962, 480). These are
determined by the geographical range of:
1. Unification by military action
2. Centralization under uniform civil adminis-
tration
3. Economic integration.
The radius of military action is greater than that
of civil administration. Following Lattimore's
ideas there is therefore an inner zone reaching into
territories that can, after conquest, be added to the
state and an outer zone into areas that can be in-
vaded for profit or for the purpose of breaking up
barbarian concentrations dangerous to the state,
but that cannot be permanently annexed. Econom-
ic integration has the shortest range, because it is
a function of the ability to transport bulk goods
at a profit. These analytical zones presumably have
some universal validity.8
But as far as imperialism and colonialism are
concerned, such a scheme represents only the
static side of the coin. When the individual areas
within an expanding empire are considered, a
dynamic picture emerges, which also shows that
both imperialism and colonialism are essentially
temporary phenomena. An area at first under
imperialist domination by a neighbouring group
may then be formally colonized and finally fully
integrated although, depending on the constraints
posed by the social and natural environment and
the capacity to overcome them, this development
may halt at any stage.
For the periphery of an empire, this means that
a frontier is created along a perimeter defined
negatively by those areas that, for whatever rea-
son, cannot be colonized, or positively by the
maximum territory brought under direct adminis-
trative control (which may lead to a very different
outcome). Such a formal frontier is, of course, only
one of many boundaries on a transept of control
from a core area outwards that could be analyti-
cally relevant according to the subject of study. In
addition, the kind of formal frontier and the way
in which it functions will vary widely depending
on the relevant circumstances in different cases.
The above-mentioned literature contains various
approaches to these problems, but it is more ap-
propriate to examine here the specific development
of the northwestern frontier in the light of the out-
lined general principles,
The origin of the frontier
As several recent studies have shown,9 the expan-
sion of the Roman state from the 2nd century B.C.
onwards was preceded by more indirect influence,
such as trade contacts with societies on its north-
ern periphery which caused changes there. A
process such as described by Nash for central Gaul,
with increasing social stratification and wealth con-
centrated in the hands of successful elites, followed
by a need to consolidate this position and thus to
create an efficient administrative structure, may
indeed have led to a process of secondary state for-
mation. The archaeological and historical evidence
indicate that Celtic society was permanently
changed from weakly organized tribal groups into
centralized and hierarchical polities. Without go-
ing into detail, the distribution of late-La Tène op-
pida and, even further to the north, of smaller for-
tifications, can be taken as an illustration (fig. 2).
This development was strongly influenced by in-
formation about conditions in the Mediterranian,
but information flows both ways, and the knowledge
of and contacts with the Gaulish area allowed not
only imperialistic domination but led to actual an-
nexation of territory at an early stage: the creation
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Fig. 2. The distribution of late-La Tène defended oppida of over 25 ha (above) and of late-La Tene fortifications of a]l sizes
(below). After Willems 1984, fig. 119.
of the republican province of Transalpine Gaul (la-
terGalliaNarbonensis) between 125 and 121 B.C.
More than sixty years elapsed before the next
phase of conquest and a change from imperialism
to colonialism took place in a northerly direction.
This was Caesar's Gallic war, and its designation
as Caesar's war is not at all inappropriate. It can
be argued that the changes in Celtic society in Cen-
tral Gaul, brought about by contacts with Rome,
had effectively prepared the way for this conquest.
But that does not make such a major enterprise
the logical next step. After all, client states under
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imperialist control were still of major importance
elsewhere more than a century later. Perhaps it
is true that Caesar's personality was the decisive
factor. But even then, the conquest as such can
still be seen as yet another consequence of
peripheral imperialism.
As was recently argued by Bloemers, the socio-
logical concept of peripheral imperialism is emi-
nently suitable for understanding the process of
Roman expansion.10 The idea is that apart from,
or even instead of, a deliberate policy formulated
by the rulers in the core area, expansion also arises
from the activities of their representatives in the
periphery, who deal directly with local elites. Sup-
port of one party in a conflict, personal ambition,
and the like, may then trigger a series of events
starting with some actual interference and ending
in a true conquest. Roman history has recorded
many such situations
For Gaul, and especially for its northern parts,
Caesar's untimely death may have prevented com-
pletion of the colonialist incorporation, but it did
proceed far enough to allow effective manipula-
tion of events in those northern regions. The limit-
ed available data show, however, that this manipu-
lation could not rely simply on a power-policy and
that direct inteference, the use of (military) force,
was necessary. Examples are the activities of
Agrippa in 38 or 37 B.C. and the offensive against
German tribes in the following two decades includ-
ing one, the clades Lolltana, that ended in defeat. "
Groupes such as the Suebi, Tencteri, and Usipetes
were prevented from settling west of the Rhine
while others, such as the Cananefates, Batabi,
Cugerni, and Ubii, were deliberately moved
there.12 As is evident from fig. 3, these groups,
as allies of Rome, were settled in a highly strateg-
ic position along the Rhine.
The reasons for this direct interference could be
related to what has been said earlier about the na-
ture of power, which rests on the perception and
correct evaluation by the dominated party. It can
be argued that the egalitarian tribal groups in the
north could not do that, so that they were less sus-
ceptible to the use of power. In a centrally or-
ganized hierarchical society it is a paramount chief
or the decision-making upper stratum of society
who take action. This institution, in organizational
terms a high-level regulator, allows both the per-
ception and — at least in principle — the correct
Fig. 3 The approximate location of tribes in Germania Inferi-
or and north of the Rhine from the late-lst century B.C.
onwards.
evaluation of power, which is why the institute of
client kingdoms was fairly effective in the East. In
a tribal organization, however, such a central in-
formation processing and control unit is lacking
and it can be argued that, for a tribal society as
a whole, there are no efficient direct means of
evalutation. In terms of systems theory, '3 it can
be said that there is not enough channel capacity
to process the information input because the cul-
tural system as a whole lacks a high-level regula-
tor who can act with speed and flexibility. In prac-
tical terms, any petty chieftain can take a chance
and there is no central authority to hold him back.
One obvious response of a cultural system in its
effort to cope with changed circumstances more
effectively is organizational change, and that is one
way to view the process of secondary state forma-
tion in Central Gaul in the last century B.C. and
also the developments in northern Gaul during and
after the Gallic war. But there is another side to
this, namely, that of the larger organizational
structure controlling new units, in our case the Ro-
man empire. For effective control, a multi-level
(hierarchical) regulatory system is needed. Given
a certain amount of time, as in slow imperialist
expandion, this may develop gradually as a
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response of dominated societies around the
perimeter. But in the case of rapid colonialist ex-
pansion by conquest, new units cannot be con-
trolled permanently, let alone be incorporated, un-
less their structure is somehow altered more
directly.
The succesful Roman interference in the North
Belgic area between Caesar and Drusus can thus
be seen in this light, but so can the ultimate failure
to conquer Germania Magna. Germanic societies
could not be controlled by limited force followed
by a power-policy. Thus, their structure made
them the subject of much direct use of military
force but on the other hand it prevented that force
from having its intended effect. After all, the ability
of the empire to apply such force was limited, cer-
tainly in view of the magnitude of the task, if not
with respect to the capacity for staging campaign
after campaign then at least as far as imposed
changes of the indigenous social structure were
concerned.
From a historical or economic point of view
there is more to say about all this, but basically
it is considered here the main reason why expan-
sion into Germany stopped and a frontier was es-
tablished. One may, for example, point to politi-
cal difficulties or to the "environmental confict"
which arose from the difficulties to find enough
food locally to feed the army. But that situation
was not due to a harsh natural environment but
to its limited exploitation and thus again to the
socio-economic structure of the groups living there.
Evidently, there was little to be gained by conquest
of their territory, a factor which Mocsy (1978) con-
vincingly shows to have been the underlying rea-
son for Augustus' advice to restrict the empire wi-
thin its (then) existing boundaries. '4 Outside the
established frontier, in what Lattimore would call
the outer zone of military control, force, diplomacy
and other, commercial, contacts were a constant
factor.l3 But only inside was there centralization
under uniform civil administration. It is in this
area that processes of (further) acculturation and
integration into the socio-economic system of the
empire are triggered.
However, during the 1st century A.D., a tran-
sition can be observed from what Luttwak
describes as a hegemonic empire (with "frontiers
of inclusion"), towards a territorial empire, with
most of the military apparatus deployed along its
"frontier of exclusion" (fig. 4). This introduces
a vital difference not only between areas within or
outside the designated perimeter, but also betwen
those directly at the frontier and the areas more
to the interior of the empire. These are not mere-
ly closer to the core area and thus more easily in-
corporated into Lattimore's inner zone of econom-
ic integration. There is another difference as well,
namely, that after the conquest troops move on
and the regions concerned can develop further wi-
thin the new context. At the frontiers, once estab-
lished, the situation is different because there
troops are stationed permanently, thus perpetu-
ating aspects of the otherwise transitional coloni-
al situation. When almost the total instrument of
imperial force is located in the frontier regions, it
is clear that these have a disproportionately large
infrastructure imposed on them. At the north-
western frontier of the Roman empire it is this fac-
tor in particular which may initially have prevent-
ed and later have led to a very different kind of
integration. This will be examined next.
The frontier zone
In Lower Germany, the creation of a "frontier of
exclusion", the limes, can be dated to reign of
Claudius. It followed the abandonment of plans
to conquer Germania Magna and the start of the
conquest of Britannia. Although different in de-
tail, a very similar process started there. The con-
quest was never a real problem, but keeping con-
trol without the constant use of military force
was, '6 and that led to a similar result: the build-
ing of Hadrian's wall.
After it had first been established, the limes along
the Rhine did not, of course, remain the same. It
was subjected to minor as well as — in Upper Ger-
many — to major changes and adaptations. '7
Sometimes this further development is a highly sig-
nificant reflection of processes in the frontier zone
itself. But all stages of development between the
mid-1st and mid-3rd centuries are equally suitable
to illustrate the impact of the military infrastruc-
ture. Fig. 5 illustrates one such phase, the situa-
tion in the early-Flavian period.
The limes itself delimits, in Lattimore's termi-
nology, the radius of centralization under uniform
civil administration, the end-product (in that peri-
od) of the process of colonialist expansion. It
formed, at the same time, the base-line for a zone
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Fig. 4. Two models of empire. After Luttwak 1976, fig. 1.2.
stretching further to the north which could be con-
trolled by military means and, with additional ac-
tivities such as trade and diplomacy, could be sub-
jected to imperialist domination. But the limes had
to be maintained, and it is obvious that this re-
quired further input from the hinterland.
Even apart from historical evidence,18 simple
logic dictates that whenever and wherever possi-
ble frontier areas were made to pay for themselves.
But there are numerous studies showing that this
ideal was seldomly reached and that, at the level
of the empire as a whole, there were inner
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provinces producing a surplus which was spent in
the outer — especially northern — provinces (and,
of course, in the centre).19 There are differences
in this respect between the Danubian area, the
Thine area, and Britain,20 but the principle re-
mains the same and it is understandable. After all,
there were not only costs but benefits as well, in
particular where the security of the empire was
concerned.
When viewed from the perspective of the front-
ier zone, this means that economic, social, or ad-
ministrative developments are all subordinated to
the primary, military objective. It is, for example,
remarkable that the military districts of Lower and
Upper Germany were only converted into formal
provinces by Domitian, between A.D. 82 and
90.2I This measure had nothing to do with the at-
tainment of a stable situation. After all, the Up-
per German frontier was in the process of being
advanced to include the salient between Rhine and
Danube. As has often been observed the measure
in fact had little practical meaning, but precisely
because of this it can be seen as the formal confir-
mation of the fact that local conditions were now
transformed and adapted to Roman needs. And
that, evidently, took a long time.
The underlying reason, which also explain the
difference from other areas such as the western
Danubian provinces, Belgica, or Britannia, can be
sought in the structure of native societies in the
north. As long as the idea of conquering Germa-
nia had not been abandoned, these people were
relatively independent allied tribes. But when the
limes was built they too were subjected to strong
acculturative pressure. This process has recently
been described in detail for the Batavians (Willems
1984), where it appears to have been the true cause
of their revolt. The same pattern can, however,
be seen in many other uprisings: that of Vercin-
getorix against Caesar, the Dalmatian-Pannonian
revolt under Augustus, or the rebellion of Boudicca
in Nero's reign. As Dyson (1971) concluded in his
study of the subject, all native revolts occurred in
the context of enforced acculturation.22
Although similar processes can thus be observed
in these different areas, the further development
was nevertheless different. When the army had
moved out of Gaul or southern Britain, relatively
balanced and integrated economic systems origi-
nated. Although much work still needs to be done
on the analysis of these (Hingley 1982), it is evi-
dent that they are very different from the situa-
tion at the frontiers in the Germanics or northern
Britain. An example in case is the above cited
study on the Batavian area in the north of Lower
Germany, which showed that the area had a den-
dritic central-place system and a strongly primate
"colonial" rank-size distribution of settlements.
Other lines of inquiry, such as Middleton's
(1979) study on the importance of army supply
from Gaul, support this interpretation. Another
aspect, however, is the supply of the frontier region
from beyond the limes. For Lower Germany, for
example, there is good archaeological, epigraphi-
cal, and archaezoological evidence for imports
from the Frisian area on the North Sea coast.
Bloemers (1983b), in his discussion of some of the
evidence, also called attention to another form of
"import" from beyond the frontier, namely, of
soldiers for the army.
This became more and more necessary in the
course of time. The epigraphical record has rev-
ealed that recruiting for the army was increasing-
ly limited to the frontier zones, but during the 3rd
century other measures were necessary. Not only
recruiting beyond the Rhine but also, for exam-
ple, the fact that the habit whereby sons entered
their fathers military profession was made com-
pulsory. 23 The military character of the frontier
was thus stengthened and it benefited at the same
time from the Severan measures and reforms
which were quite favourable towards the military
in general. Together with other indications24 this
suggests that a rather prosperous, strongly milita-
rized population group with caste-like properties
developed in the 2nd century.
This development towards a self-perpetuating
military frontier population can be considered to
be a form of integration, made possible by the sta-
ble and virtually unchanging deployment of troops
from the early-2nd century onwards. But even
though the archaeological evidence from this
period shows a great deal of acculturation the so-
cial and economic structure of the frontier zone
remained different from, and dependent on, the
hinterland. This despite the fact that by the end
of the 2nd century the favourable geographical po-
sition had caused part of the frontier area, the Ger-
man Rhineland and the adjacent eastern part of
Gallia Belgica, to become a centre of economic ac-
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Fig. 5. The Rhine frontier in the Early-Flavian Period, after Schonbergcr 1985, Map C and Willelm 1984, fig. 130. A: fort.
B: possible fort of uncertain dating, C: legionary fortress l Katwijk, 2 Valkenburg Z.H.. 3 Roomburg. 4 Alphen,
5 Zwammerdam, 6 Bodegraven. 7 Woerden. 8 Vleuten, 9 Utrecht. 10 Vechten. 11 Rijswijk. 12 Maurik, 13 Rossum, 14 Kestern,
15 Driel. 16 Meinerswijk, 17 Duiven-Looward. 18 Herwen-De Bijland. 19 Nijmegen. 20 Cuiik, 21 Rindern. 22 Altkalkar,
23 Xanten. 24 Moers-Asberg. 25 Krefeld-Gellep. 26 Neuss, 27 Koln-Alteburg, 28 Bonn, 29 Remagen, 30 Andernach,
31 Bendorf, 32 Koblenz, 33 Bingen. 34 Mainz. 35 Mainz-Weisenau, 36 Mamz-Kastel, 37 Wiesbaden, 38 Hofheim a. Ts.,
39 Frankfurt, 40 Heddernheim. 41 Okarben. 42 Friedberg. 43 Gross-Gerau, 44 Gcrnsheim. 45 Rheingönheim, 46 Ladenburg.
47 Hcidelberg-Beuenheim. 48 Speyer. 49 Selz.
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Fig. 6 The 4th-cenlury defence-in-depth system of Germania
Secunda and part of Belgica Secunda. Most of the indicated
fortifications are of Constantiman and/or Valentmian date.
Legend: 1 fortified town. 2 less or more certain fortification,
3 less or more certain road fort (fortified settlements or burgi
along land-or water-routes), 4 other late-Roman urban settle-
ments. Sites: l Oudenburg. 2 Domburg, 3 Westerchouwen,
4 Oostvoorne, 5 Katwijk (B ritten burg), 6 Valkenburg Z.H .
7 Vleuten, 8 Utrecht, 9 Maurik, 10 Rhenen, llRossum,
12 Kessel, 13 Wijchen, 14 Ewijk, 15 Drie], 16 Memerswijk,
17Huissen, 18 Nijmegen, 19 Heumensoord, 20 Cuijk,
21 Asperden, 22 Qualburg, 23 Altkalkar, 24 Xanten.
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tivity. But the increased contacts across the Rhine,
in analytical terms the transfer of matter and in-
formation, had led to social change in Germania
as well. This allowed Germanic groups, collective-
ly described as Franks, to muster enough military
force on a more permanent basis to be a major
threat for the limes-based defence system and that
was, in the end, an important cause ofthat sys-
tem's collapse.
The Role of the Periphery
After the invasion of the late-3rd century, there
is no more archaeologial evidence of the distinc-
tive militarized population groups along the front-
ier. Considering their role in the defence and the
exposed position of their homeland, that is not very
surprising. But most territory of the frontier
provinces, and a substantial part of their popula-
tion, did in fact survive after the invasions: only
the coastal region and the Agri Decumates, be-
tween Rhine and Danube, were lost. Under Dio-
cletian the new provinces of Germania I and II
were reorganized, the latter perhaps even enlarged
to the south.25
This may have been related to the reform of the
defensive system, which was started already un-
der Gallienus but truly effectuated only by Con-
stantine. The essential change as analysed by Lutt-
wak (1976), is that from a /i'm«-based system of
forward defence to a defence-in-depht system
(Fig. 6). This proved to be a very effective strate-
gy to ensure the security of the empire, but for
border regions it was not so beneficial because it
implied increased exposure to Frankish raids. The
rather strong reduction of the population in the
4th century — for some areas to only 25% of its
former level ^6 — can partly be attributed to this
insecurity.
But the risk of the late-Roman defensive system
is best demonstrated by the events in Germania
II after the usurpation of Magnentius in A.D. 350.
Frankish invasions followed (even Cologne was oc-
cupied in A.D. 355), and when order was restored
by Julianus, "the Apostate", the northern civitates
of the province (centres in Xanten and Nijmegen)
no longer existed. Only the civitates Agrippinensium
(Cologne) and Tungrorum (Tongeren) are still men-
tioned in late-4th-century sources. But this did not
mean that the area as such was lost. Both archaeo-
logical and historical sources confirm that Roman
power was restored up to the Rhine.
The northern area was, however, settled by
Franks, notably the Salii which had come from the
northern Netherlands. Evidently, these Franks
were reliable allies in the new land, in a situation
of relative independence that in many ways resem-
bled the situation in early-Roman times, when
Ubii, Cugerni, Batabi, and Cananefates were set-
tled there. Finds indicate that these Franks were
supplied with money and goods from the Roman
hinterland. All this is not very surprising, because
control of the delta of Rhine and Meuse was of
great importance, e.g., for the shipments of Brit-
ish grain to the German Rhineland.
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It is a well-known fact that the late-Roman army
consisted for a very large part of foreign, German-
ic, troops, and German officers reached even the
highest ranks (Waas 1965). The situation in the
north of Germania ÎÏ fits into this picture, although
in a rather extreme way because the population
as such consisted largely of immigrants. There is
a wealth of archaeological evidence, such as
weapons , other metal objects, pottery, burials and
— although as yet only to a limited degree — set-
tlement structure's, to show that this population
rapidly developed a Romano-Germanic culture of
its own.27 The distribution of some of the materi-
al, notably some of the metal objects and pottery,
does, however, show that close contacts were
maintained with people in the north, on the North
Sea coast. In this respect, new finds have only fur-
ther strengthened the evidence that was assembled
. by Böhme (1974).
This archaeological observation fits into the evi-
dence from written sources. Reports on raids from
— and retaliatory expeditions into the lands of —
tribes beyond the Rhine are not lacking, but in
general the situation seems to have been relative-
ly quiet and stable compared to that elsewhere
along the northern frontier. -B This is also evident
during the last phase of effective Roman rule when
Stilicho quickly concluded a number of apparent-
ly effective treaties. For example, it is said in a
panegyric of A.D. 399 that the Salii were able to
cultivate their lands in peace.29 Even when troops
were removed to Italy and, after the Vandal raid
on Mainz in A.D. 406, disaster struck through-
out Germania I and Belgica, everything remained
quiet in Germania II. It is evident that the Franks
had become a major regional force which could
maintain stable relations with its transrhenish
neighbours and prevent its territory from being
invaded.
This implies that the Salii and associated tribes,
living in increasingly close contact with Gallo-
Roman society for more than a century and es-
sentially being part of it for half time, had under-
gone considerable socio-political change. In a
sense, the process was similar to that which is nor-
mally described as the Romanization (although the
accumulation was mutual) of the natives which
were incorporated in the empire in the 1st centu-
ry. But there is a major difference as well. The Salii
had already changed, through indirect contact, be-
fore the 3rd century: when we use the rather vague
Roman terminology which was used for the first
time in that century we might say that, from be-
ing Germans, they had already become Franks.
And for some of these Franks this process was
accelerated under favourable circumstances, when
the empire had a shortage of force and they them-
selves a clear perception of its power. Thus,
although in a Ist-century context the two-sidedness
of the accumulation process tends to be underes-
timated, we can safely conclude that it was much
stronger, and thus more visible by archaeological
means, in late-Roman times. There was as much
Germanization as there was Romanization and we
have, in fact, a classical frontier "meltingpot"
which led to the formation of a whole new society.
We can profitably see the north of Germania I
as the nursery of this society, but it could not sur-
vive there. A larger and more viable polity was
created by the historically and archaeologically at-
tested Prankish move southward. In about A.D.
450 the Salii had already established a kingdom
reaching the river Somme. The inclusion of the
fertile lands of Gaul also provided a new econom-
ic basis, to replace contacts with the north and,
not to forget, the termination of trade between Bri-
tain and the Rhineland. This development can be
interpreted as a further step towards state forma-
tion. Archaeologically, the development of socie-
ty can be seen, for example, in the burialtradition
that reflects an increasingly stratified and well-
defined social organization. Another step was the
condification of Salian law, the Lex Salica (pactus
legis Salicae), probably early in the 6th century un-
der Childeric's son Chlodoweg.30 The latter king
also unified the different Prankish polities into one
kingdom, which meant the formal completion of
the process of state formation. The royal lineage
of the Salii, the Merovingians, gave its name to
this new state, the Merovingian kingdom.
The emergence of this early-medieval state can
thus be directly related to the frontier society which
developed at the interface of the late-Roman em-
pire and its northern neighbours. In this way, the
Salian kings succeeded where a few centuries earli-
er the frontier groups which were the basis of
Postumus' Gallic empire had failed. The ultimate
cause of this difference can, of course, be found
in the different situation in the core of the empire,
but that should not lead us to be blind for the role
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of the periphery. Postumus' empire was, no mat- by contrast, was the end-product of non-
ter how independent they may have been, carried integration: of a process which not only success-
by groups that were essentially integrated into the fully combined elements from both sides but which
Roman empire and different from those outside was, in addition, an original development at the
that larger structure. The Merovingian kingdom, periphery.
NOTES
1. See e.g. Groenman-van Waatennge 1980, Boemers 1983a,
Wfflems 1984, Haselgrove 1984.
2. Examples are Miller/Steffen 1977 and Savage/Thompson
1979.
3. The following paragraph has largely been derived from
Willems 1984, chapter 11
4. See esp. Horvath 1972 and Fieldhouse 1981.
5. Fieldhouse, op. ctt. distinguishes further between the process
whereby a whole population moves to the new territory
(colonization in its classical Greek sense) and that involv-
ing only an elite to manage the dependent society
(colonialism).
6. Service 1962 [197J] , 166-9. It is perhaps useful TO stress
that the analytical concept of colonialism as employed here
should not be understood in its 19th and early-20th cen-
tury meaning, which has many connotations that are
anachronistic where archaic civilizations are concerned.
7. Lattimore 1962. They were developed on the basis of his
studies on Chinese frontiers, but they fit well into modern
theories of comparative frontier studies (see esp Miller/
Steffen 1977).
8. An example is Hedeager's (1978) study on Roman-
Germanic exchange.
9. See Nash 1978, BLoemers 1983a, Haselgrove 1984, to
name only a few.
10. Bloemers 1983a. On "Caesar's war", see also Drinkwater
1983, 14-7.
11. See the overviews in Rüger 1968, 8 and Von Petrikovits
1978, 53 A simple punitive expedition such as that by Mar-
cus Vinicius against transrhenish tribes for the murder of
Roman traders in 25 B.C. (reported by Cassius Dio LIII
24,2) was most likely a typical case for a whole series of
similar events. This particular incident could well have sur-
vived in the records only because this same person, a good
friend of Augustus, later became supreme commander of
the Rhine legions.
12. For a full discussion of the argument, see Willems 1984,
chapter 10.3.
13. See Peebles/Kus 1977, esp. the paragraph on "organiza-
tion, energy, information, and ritual", 427-31.
14. Tacitusv Ann. 1,11: consilium coercendi intra terminas imperil,
which was the final clause in his political testament con-
cerning the State of the Empire.
15. Which did result eventually in permanent changes there.
In principle, this is also a process which can be seen as
one of the necessary conditions for the developments in
the 3rd century and later.
16. For stimulating analyses of the pre-conquest situation and
its significance, and of post-conquest developments see,
respectively, Haselgrove 1984 and Hingley 1982.
37. The most recent overview of this development for the en-
tire area is provided by Schönberger I985.
18. See e.g. Mocsy 1978.
19. A recent discussion of the argument is provided by Hop-
kins 1980.
20. See, respectively, Birley 1981, WOlems 1984, and Fulford
1984
21. Relevant literature in Schönberger 1985, 366 and note 189.
22. The same is true for "succesfull" rebellions such as those
of Arminius and, a few years later, of the Frisians
23. Cf. Mann 1983, 67 on legionary recruitment, but the sys-
tem presumably applied to auxiliaries as well
24. For example, Gechter's (1984) study on fibuia-distributions,
and the epigraphical and historical evidence assembled by
Mócsy (1978, 21-24).
25. By the addition of the dittos Tungrorurn; it is still uncer-
tain whether this ovitas originally belonged to Belgica or
to Germana Inferior.
26. See Willems 1984, 275-6.
27. For a discussion see Bloemers 1983b and Willems 1984,
chapter 12. A useful overview for the adjacent area in the
Rhineland is given by Von Petrikovits 1978, 230-45 and
285-91.
28. An overview in Willems 1984, 277-9.
29. Claudianus XXI, De consulate Stilichoms I, 222.
30. Sec Zöllner 1970, 112 f.
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